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It may be said in advance that any reform in the mechanics indicated in the title
of this article is not likely to prove a major remedy for property tax delinquency.
But the same may be said of any other possible property tax reform proposal. Delinquency is in. itself an evil; but it is also a symptom of more basic maladjustments.
It will have to be attacked in more than one way. However, the suggestions here
made have merits on other grounds than mere prevention of delinquency.1
L THE

CALENDAR

Despite variations among them, the property tax calendars of the several states
bear a family resemblance to each other. They were developed with certain requirements in mind, which were fundamentally the same in all the states. They grow
out bf the function assigned to the property tax in all the states. This tax is a
deficiency tax, raising whatever sums are required by the local governmental budgets,
and to a diminishing degree the state budgets, after the deduction of the revenue
expected from other sources. The fact that this tax, for most local governments at
least, furnishes nearly all of the revenue, does not minimize the use of the tax as the
elastic element in the local and state tax systems.
The functions which the calendar is designed, or has been developed, to serve are
simple enough in principle. First, the taxable property is to be assessed, a process
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which is nothing more than the determination of the quantity and value thereof.
Strictly speaking, only the value is required, since the tax is ad valorem. If. the
original assessment were acceptable to the taxpayers, only one more function would
be required, namely, the extension of the tax on the valuation. Because the original
assessment is faulty, or is deemed so by at least some of the taxpayers, several supplementary functions are required. Second, the calendar makes room for the local
review, developed to iron out errors and inequalities among individual taxpayers;
Third, the calendar must make room for an equalization among the political units,
towns or counties, and among classes of property, to eliminate possible discriminations. Fourth, upon the roll, thus presumably corrected, the tax must be extended
for every owner of taxable property in the county or town. Fifth, the calendar must
as a practical matter provide for a waiting period, between the date when the taxes
are due and the date on which they become delinquent, for the obvious reason that
the payment requires time. At this point, as far as the taxpayer is concerned, the
calendar might stop, if all went by the card, if all taxes were paid on or before the
delinquent date. The fact that they are not all paid then, necessitates an extension
of the calendar to provide for dates of sale, redemption, penalties, interest, and final
granting of title to delinquent property. In this article, however, the attention is
limited largely to the five parts of the calendar described above, the balance being
treated in other articles in this volume.
In its relation to property tax delinquency, the calendar may be considered from
three angles. First, most of the calendars are too long. They consume too much
time between the assessment date (the date as of which the assessment takes effect)
and the delinquency date (the date after which interest and penalties become
effective). It is true that criticism of the calendars in some of the states may also
arise because they do not adequately provide for all of the five essential steps in the
procedure outlined above, by .not providing, for example, for adequate local review
or state equalization. And such omissions may produce poor assessments, which in
turn may react unfavorably on the collection. But too long a calendar lengthens the
time between the day when the tax becomes a lien on the property and the day on
which it becomes delinquent. In this interval many things may happen to the
property, especially in case of personal property, and to the taxpayer, rendering him
unable or unwilling to pay the tax.
Implicit in the long tax-determination interval is the assumption that the tax, once
levied, is safe for the treasury, because of the lien on the property. Relying upon
this safety, the administration could proceed by leisurely stages, and protect itself by
interest and penalties high and heavy enough to reimburse it for interest paid on
money borrowed to offset the deferred payment or non-payment of delinquent taxes.
But the lien is in fact not safe, on any class of property. Taxes on personal property,
tangible as well as intangible, remain unpaid in large amounts because the property,
present at the assessment, has been moved away before the delinquent day. Real
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estate may be "skinned," by removing timber or minerals during the interval; laws
making such skinning illegal are difficult to enforce, and in any case touch only the
most obvious cases. Even in case of land and fixtures, the value, the essence of
property for purposes of taxation, may vanish, as is all too frequently demonstrated
in the taxes unpaid. Shortening the tax-determining interval would reduce these
hazards to the tax lien.
The characteristic interval between the tax day and the delinquent day is 10-14
months, but the spread is wide on both sides of a norm of about ixi
months. There
is considerable opportunity for shortening the interval, as indicated by the fact that
several states run as low as eight months.- In those states which permit instalment
payments, where the interval between the first and second payment is usually six
months, the second half of the tax will not be payable until 15 to 20 months after the
day as of which the tax liability attached to the property.
What is a reasonable interval for the determination of the tax liability of individual taxpayers, with respect to particular parcels of real property? If two months
be allowed for the assessment, one for the local review, one for the preparation of
the abstract for delivery to the state board of equalization, two for the state equalization, two for the extension of the taxes on the roll, and one for payment prior to the
delinquent date, all the necessary, functions of the tax-determination process would
seem to be allowed for, and the total time amount to only nine months. This happens to be about the interval used in Wisconsin, and would seem to be ample, if
the frills be eliminated. A number of states do the job in less time.
In the second place, although of less importance, it may be asked whether the
interval, whatever it be, begins and ends at the most advantageous point in the
scascns. Historically this factor has been important. Of the eight states in the
southern tier of states, five begin their calendar with the assessment of January x;
one, of February; another, California, of March, while Alabama begins the year,
"the year before," as of October i. In contrast, of the ixstates in the northern tier,
five begin on April i and four on May I,the two nonconforming states preferring
July and January, respectively. In the choice of these beginning dates, it was of
weight that they marked the season when in an agricultural economy there would
be no crops and, in short, a minimum value. The assessor, who was likely to be a
farmer, would have time for the assessment; and in rough areas he would be able
to "get, around" relatively unimpeded by winter weather. In the choice of the delinquent dates, it was desirable that they should fall at a season when the taxpayer
.would likely be "in funds." Undoubtedly these factors are of less weight now.
-Particularly, it is difficult to find a season when the dominant class is in funds, all
the more so where instalment payment is 'permitted.
In the third place, the calendar may be ill-proportioned, allowing improper time
for the various functions, or it may be loaded with unnecessary details and processes
which have gotten themselves imbedded in the system. For example the practice
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of several states, chiefly in the south, of self-assessment appears to be a relatively
useless procedure which, nevertheless, it would be difficult to remove. It probably
saves very little time for the assessor when he comes to go after the items that have
not been rendered voluntarily. It may of course be said that, say, two months spent
by the assessor in receiving voluntary renditions of property are merely a sort of
preliminary to the assessment; but they are really a part of it since they widen the
interval between the tax day and the delinquent day.
But it would be foolish to place much faith in the shortening of the tax-determining interval as a remedy for delinquency so long as the present function of the
property tax as a deficiency measure prevails. If the tax liability must be determined
completely, barring resort to the courts on matters of law, and by a long and involved process as at present, before any tax payment is required, then the ultimate
minimum of time required can not be much less than, say, eight months. If, instead
of being an apportioned tax, calculated to raise any necessary amount, it were to
become a percentage tax, with the rates stated in the law rather than to be computed
as at present, then the property owner might be required to file a return, and remit
payment with return, thereby materially shortening or eliminating the tax-determining interval, as is the practice in the administration of the personal income tax. Any
one at all familiar with fiscal organization and administration will realize that
such a shift would require changes at innumerable points other than in the procedure
of assessment and tax collection.
Making the property tax a percentage tax would doubtless facilitate collection and
reduce delinquency, once it were in working order. But as a matter of reform
solely in the interest of better collection, such a shift would not be wise. On the other
hand, if tax limitations continue to be adopted to restrict the tax rate below or on
the stated limit; if new sources of revenue continue to be found; if state assumption
of hitherto local functions and state equalization of educational and other hitherto
local governmental costs are extended, the property tax will in effect be a percentage
tax, and only in form an apportioned tax. To change the form to correspond to the
real character would not then be very difficult. In such an event, the shortening,
or the elimination, or the deferring of the final tax determination until after the
initial tax payment would, it may be safely predicted, facilitate the collection and
reduce the delinquency. But this condition is a long way from being realized.
II.

INSTALMENT PAYMENTS

It seems hardly necessary to argue that property taxes should be paid or at least
payable in instalments, rather than in one annual lump sum. But here again, the
practice must be defended mostly on other and broader grounds and only to a small
extent on the ground of preventing delinquency, although it will undoubtedly have
the effect of collecting a larger percentage of the taxes levied. The only argument
that can be made against instalment payments is the probability that the cost of
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collection will be slightly increased, although it may be expected that the increased
collections to be expected will more than overcome this loss. Some sort of estimate
of the increased cost of instalment payments could probably be had from states
permitting instalments, particularly from those which have recently made the
change from an annual to an instalment basis. As far as the writer is aware, no
such studies have been made, at least of an .extended scope. This same may be
said of the increases in the collections thdt might be expected from allowing instalments.
From the treasury point of view, aside from the increase in the collections to be
expected, instalment payments smooth out the stream of revenue flowing into the
treasury, and thereby tend to eliminate alternating heavy treasury balances and
deficiency borrowing. They also tend to render the payment of the property tax
less odious. At present, on this point, it suffers by comparison with sales taxes, in
which the payment is concealed. From the taxpayer's point of view instalment
payment would be desirable because of the deferment of the payment. The only
class of taxpayers to whom lump-sum annual payment is advantageous is composed
of those whose property-tax due date happens to coincide with the date of a relatively
large receipt of disposable cash. For obvious reasons, this class must be small. In
view of these undoubted net advantages of instalment payments, the fact that about
one-half of the states still require payment once each year only, is strong evidence
of inertia.
III. PENALTIES AND INTEREST

It is obvious that taxes can not be collected without penalties in the present form
of society. It is also obvious that these penalties may assume a great diversity of
form, serving more or less effectively the purpose of compelling payment on or before
the delinquent date. It may be, but rarely is, solely in the form of a flat rate on the
amount delinquent, as io% in Arkansas. This form may stimulate payment on or
before the due date; but since the penalty does not increase after that date with
continued non-payment, it must operate to encourage non-payment until just before
the sale of the property for the tax. The penalty may be in the form of interest,
beginning at the delinquency date, as in case of Arizona, Nebraska and New Hampshire, where the rate is ioo per annum, until the tax is paid or the property is sold.
This form provides no special inducement to pay exactly on the due date, but does
provide a continuing pressure to pay as soon as possible or convenient. The initial
rate of interest may be changed as the delinquency period lengthens. And the flat
penalty and the continuing interest may be combined into a great variety of forms.
A similar effect may be had by allowing an abatement or a discount for prepayment
or for payment before a specified date. Where instalment payments are permitted,
the entire amount may become due and delinquent if the first instalment is not paid
on or before the due date. The possibility for combinations may be imagined. The
penalty system is apparently not identical in any two states.
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What is not so obvious is the fact that, although penalties in some form and of
some weight are inevitable, the particular level and form of the penalty does not
seem to be a major factor in the efficiency of the collection system. The percentages
of delinquency vary widely between localities within the same state and therefore
subject to the same penalties. Whether very severe and involved systems of penalties
stimulate tax payment materially is doubtful, but in many cases they certainly do not.
If the owner is without funds and without credit, it makes very little difference what
the penalties are. If the property is overassessed or'if the value shrinks so that it
seems the more desirable alternative to let the property "fly for taxes" rather than to
pay the tax and continue the enjoyment of or income from the property, no amount
of penalties will induce the payment of the tax. And it is probable that the overwhelming share of all delinquency is due to one or both of these causes.
It ought to follow therefore that the penalty system need not be very severe or
very complicated. Yet there seems to be merit in providing not only an incentive
to payment before the delinquent date but also a continuing inducement to payment
after that date. This double requirement may be met by a combination of a
moderate lump-sum penalty and a moderate rate of interest, both becoming applicable on the delinquent date. Such a system is exemplified by the Michigan system,
with a slight variation, of a 4% penalty (collection fee) applicable on January io,
plus Y4 of i% per month from March i. A similar system is that of Wisconsin, in
which state there is a 2% penalty as of February i, and an interest of I% per month,
the maximum interest to be 8%. The effect of these combinations is to make the
penalty (penalty and interest) regressive with the length of the delinquency, which
seems proper. The variations in the penalty systems indicate that the philosophies
on which the penalties are based are often at variance with the one just suggested.
The question may be raised as to the proper severity of both the penalty and the
interest. It would be presumptious to set up rates for these figures to be applied
throughout the country, for the rate of interest and other pertinent factors differ
from state to state. The rates should be set with two principal considerations in
mind: First, to hold the treasury reasonably undamaged from the delinquency, but
not to derive revenue from a misfortune befalling its citizens-taxpayers; second, to
provide an inducement adequate to stimulate taxpayers in funds or in credit to pay
their taxes promptly rather than, in effect, to borrow money from the treasury, by
deferring the tax payment. The level of the penalty and interest rates required by
these two considerations will have to be found by experience. It seems that neither
of these considerations, or both of them together, could have dictated some of the
existing penalty systems. There seems, for example, to be no reason for Nevada's
system which consists of the flat penalty of 15%, plus interest at the rate of 3% per

month, both applicable to the amount unpaid on the delinquent date.
Whatever the form and level of the penalty scheme, one thing should be clear.
The penalties will be ineffective if they are to be withdrawn, as they have been
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during the depression of 1929, whenever the property tax becomes hard to pay. Some
other method of giving relief to such as may be deserving thereof should be devised.
A general withdrawal of penalties benefits deserving and undeserving alike, and
damages both alike tfirough the detriment to the public services, which the fiscal
chaos of such remissions produce. It may be that the political pressure for relief in
such cases is too strong for most legislatures to resist. If so, we have here an
insoluble problem in property taxation. For hard times are, of all times, the times
when the penalties ought to work. But this problem will be treated in another
article of this volume.2
IV. DiscouNTS
The practice of allowing discounts for prompt payment, for payment before a
specified date, after the due date, or for prepayment before the due date was extended
by some of the states as a result of the depression, since x929. These ventures are
mostly experimental; some of them were dictated by the emergency, and were
probably unsound. The following types may be distinguished:
First, the local and optional discounts. In four of the New England states it is
optional with the towns to order or to vote discounts within statutory limits. This
form of discount is rare elsewhere; and its purposes are rnot obvious.
Second, in Kansas a 2% discount may be allowed on the second half of the tax
if it is paid on or before December 20, the delinquency date for the first half. It is
difficult to see the justification for this device. It is advantageous to the taxpayers
with money, for whom the discount amounts to an absolutely safe and tax-free
investment at 4%o for six months. These taxpayers would not become delinquent
anyway. As for the treasury, the effects are dubious. It is well that it has not spread
far.

Third, in Florida, North Carolina, Oregon, and Utah a scheme of discounts for
prepayment and prompt payment has been ad6pted, which, in so far as it is actually
used, may advance the payments to a date much nearer the assessment date, and is
so far to the good. In North Carolina, for example, the assessment day is April i.
Having completed the standard steps in the calendar, the taxes become due on the
first Monday in October, and delinquent on the first day of February. If paid on or
before November i, a discount of i% is allowed; if paid after November i and on
or before December i, the discount is only Y2 of x%; and payments made thereafter
but not after the delinquent date are made at par. These discounts on payments
made between the due date and the delinquent date are the customary discounts for
"prompt" payment. They can be made in the exact amounts due, since the taxes
have already been extended prior to the due date. But prepayments may be made
on or before July i, with a discount of 3%; and thereafter until the due date, with
the discount declining by Y2 of i% for each month. The prepayments must be made
in tentative amounts, since the exact rate and amount of the tax is not known at
2See SMith, Recent Legigative indulgences to Delinquent Taxpayers, infra, 371, at p. 372.
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that time. The results of this prepayment scheme are unknown to the writer of
this prticle.* On the face of it, the scheme possesses possibilities, on the one han4,
for spreading the payments over the year, and, on the other hand, for bunching them
at points in the season inconvenient to the treasury, since both prepayment and
"prompt" payment are optional with the taxpayers. This optional feature may be
convenient to the taxpayers who wish to pay when they are in funds. It also, like the
Kansas scheme, provides a safe, tax-free investment, in North Carolina at the rate of
something less than 6%. The scheme invites the suggestion that it might be a
transition to the practice of making payments tentatively with the return, as suggested above in this article, in other words, to the conversion of the property tax
into a percentage tax.
EarTox's NoTE: At Professor Jensen's suggestion, an inquiry was made with reference to North
Carolina experience under its prepayment scheme. The following statement was obtained from Mr. Henry
Brandis, Jr., Associate Director of the Institute of Government at Chapel Hill, North Carolina, who has
been making a study of property taxation in this state.
-nc reason for the discounts allowed prior to the due date in North Carolina is found in the fact
that, while the due date is the first Monday in October, the fiscal year begins on July x. The discount
system is designed to bring in enough money to allow the counties and cities to operate during the first
three months of the fiscal year without anticipatory borrowing with its potential deficit dangers. From
the standpoint of the units themselves it certainly served a useful purpose as long as most of them (many
being in default) could borrow nothing from the banks or could borrow only at 6%. Under present
conditions many of our units either carry over enough cash or immediately collectible delinquent taxes
to enable them to finance a large part of first quarter operations or can borrow money at far less than 6%.
At least one of our soundest units Las, for many years, budgeted enough each year to take care of the
first three months of the next fiscal year. We still have a number of units which find the discount a
desirable and even a necessary aid to first quarter financing; but those finding it expensive financing are
beginning to doubt its merits, and it may well be that it will eventually be placed on a local option basis.
Turning to its effect on tax delinquency, we can safely say: (i) that it has been chiefly used by large
personal and corporate taxpayers who see in it, particularly under present conditions, an investment
representing a certain and comparatively high return; (2) it obviously can be of no great help to that
class of taxpayers who do not have money available before autumn and whose credit facilities are not
great; and (3) it has not prevented tax delinquency, but, in'view of the fact that in some industrial
centers as high as a third of the total levy is sometimes collected prior to the due date, it must have
some tendency to reduce tax delinquency by substituting a certainty for a possibility. In the main those
who prepay could and would pay promptly otherwise. In its other aspects the discount system has:
(i) been a minor complicating factor in the making of budgets; and (2)caused considerable bookkeeping
trouble in cases in which the final tax rate varies from that estimated at the time the prepayment is made.
This last factor varies greatly with the individual unit. In a number of cases the rate is estimated
correctly, even as early as July x. When it is originally estimated incorrectly the actual rate is usually
known for some time prior to October x. So far as most taxpayers are concerned valuations have already
been finally fixed by July a, and, while it is frequently troublesome to consult the valuation records, the
valuation is seldom changed after the prepayment has been made."

